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Industrial Pensions and Wages
By John Whitmore

I

It is my purpose here to consider briefly the subject of industrial
pension systems in the United States and to consider the princi
ples involved in them and the ultimate aspects of them as far
as these are discernible. I shall consider the matter rather in
relation to manufacturing industry than in relation to railroads
and other public utilities; and as regards manufacturing industry,
at least, I shall venture to suggest that pension systems, conceived
to meet a need arising out of temporary industrial conditions,
ought, as industrial conditions change in ways that are already
indicated, gradually to cease. At present, as far as industrial
pension systems in manufacturing industry exist, they undoubt
edly, in their measure, which is by no means inconsiderable, meet
very real needs; and this will inevitably be true for a long time to
come. The question in regard to an old-age pension for a single
worker involves a working-life history, and the completing of
any radical change must be a matter of many years. It seems,
in fact, very desirable that in the meantime industrial pension
plans, formal or informal, should be generally adopted—for the
reason that they correspond to the conditions that have existed
through a large part of the lives of many workers whose old age is
still to be provided for—but always with a view to their ultimate
termination.
Important studies and criticisms of industrial pension systems
have been published in rather close succession for some years past.
Luther Conant Jr.’s Critical Analysis of Industrial Pension Sys
tems (Macmillan, 1922) is the earliest comprehensive work and is
still of the greatest possible interest. The National Industrial
Conference Board’s Industrial Pensions in the United States (1925),
partly because of its later publication, embraces in its study a still
larger number of plans. The successive annual reports of the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching have for
ten or more years past each included a critical survey of the year’s
progress in the matter. Of considerable interest are three articles
written by Gurden Edwards, published in The Annalist of 1925,
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and reprinted by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
under the title “Retirement plans in industry”; also the studies
and proposals of the old-age pensions committee of the industrial
welfare department of the National Civic Federation (1925, 1926,
1927). In the present year there is a pamphlet published by
the American Management Association under the title, "Pensions:
a problem in management,” which includes a paper by Edward S.
Cowdrick and discussion by a number of industrialists and others
with extensive pension experience. Finally, there is in progress
of publication another comprehensive study by the Industrial
Relations Counsellors, Inc., the preliminary report being dated
May, 1928.
The first industrial pension system in the United States was
inaugurated by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company in 1884.
There are probably at the present time about three hundred
formal pension systems in force in the United States. It is calcu
lated that about $50,000,000 per annum is being paid to about
100,000 pensioners, and that of this about one half is being paid
by the railroad companies to former employees. Public utilities
other than railroads and financial institutions having pension
plans total over one hundred; and manufacturing industries, ac
cording to the preliminary report of Industrial Relations Coun
sellors, Inc., one hundred and twenty-three, of which a number
are consolidations.
All industrial pension plans in the United States are in the same
stream of development, and all have been treated, I think always,
as parts of the same story. But I believe that, in the end, the
problems they present must be considered separately, according
to classes of industries.
Principally, the conditions are not the same in public utilities
and in manufacturing concerns. The former, generally speaking,
have greater permanency of existence, important in relation to
the pension promise which from the time it begins to be in effect
to its final fulfilment may spread over a period of fifty years.
They have also probably something more nearly approaching
general permanence of service, whereby a much larger proportion
of the workers will fulfil a “length of service” requirement and so
receive pensions. They have, I believe, in the last analysis, more
fixed and limited standards of pay. Bonuses and profit-sharing,
already existing and capable of great extension in manufacturing
industry, are probably impracticable in public utilities, under
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government control and government regulation of rates that may
be charged to the public. I am considering critically pension
systems in manufacturing industry only.
While practically all writers on the subject of industrial pensions
raise serious questions concerning the great majority of such
systems, as to their social morality, as to their being ultimately
practicable, as to their ever being effective at all on a sufficiently
wide scale, it seems the fashion, especially of late, to take the need
of pension systems for granted and to consider merely the ad
vantages and disadvantages of different plans. This was not quite
the position taken in the National Industrial Conference Board’s
work, nor in Luther Conant’s Critical Analysis. The former says
(p. 125), “It is not the purpose of this report to recommend or to
discourage the establishment of pension plans in industry.” The
latter discusses more searchingly the economic and moral aspects
of pension. Both give consideration and weight to the almost
totally antagonistic attitude of organized labor.
Each of the two works just mentioned reviews the history of
pension plans in the United States, and each contains an appendix
classifying them. The Critical Analysis, published in 1922, lists
94 concerns having pension plans, and Industrial Pensions in the
United States, published in 1925, lists 247 such concerns. About
one fourth of the difference, apparently, is due to the different
years of publication. It will, I think, be well to take the later
and more comprehensive list.
It is seen, as I have already noted, that the earliest formal in
dustrial pension plan in the United States was inaugurated by
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company in 1884. There were,
altogether, five such plans up to the year 1900. From 1901 to
1910, 44 were added; from 1911 to 1915, 73; from 1916 to 1920, 68;
from 1921 to 1925, 40. The maximum for a five-year period
was, then, from 1911 to 1915; after that the numbers fall. This
has been attributed to unsettled post-war conditions and to a
growing realization of ultimate costs. I am inclined to add rising
wages as a probable important cause, for I can not doubt the
relationship between the question of the adequacy of the immedi
ate wages paid to labor, and the ultimate supplementing of wages
by pensions.
Pension plans are classified primarily as non-contributory or
contributory, the former meaning that the employee makes no
money contribution to the scheme, and the latter that he contrib
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utes regularly out of his wages to the pension fund, in whatever
form this may be.
Non-contributory pension plans are further classified as dis
cretionary and limited-contractual. Contributory plans in
manufacturing industry (with the slight exception of two or three
fully contractual plans) are all limited-contractual. Discretionary
plans are defined as “reserving to the employer the exclusive
right to grant, withhold, reduce or terminate the allowance in
individual cases, or to modify or abandon the plan altogether.”
Limited-contractual plans are discretionary during the working
life, but pensions once granted may not be changed. And if the
plan is contributory the employee is entitled in any circumstances
to the eventual return of his own contributions, either with or
without interest.
It seems clear that “limited-contractual” often covers some
further contractual features when the plan is contributory. The
employer may undertake to contribute certain sums to a joint
fund. The employees may participate in the administration.
The plan may in these and other ways tend to a closer under
standing and mutual engagement between employer and employ
ees. But the conditions governing the employer’s contributions
and the employees’ contributions are still so distinct that ap
parently there is not here a single plan, but two plans, namely,
a savings plan (the employees’ contributions), and a limitedcontractual pension plan undertaken by the employer. There is
said to be a recent tendency to separate the funds, and to call the
plans “cooperative” instead of “contributory.”*
In any case, contributory plans are plainly a great advance
upon non-contributory plans. The purpose is no longer merely
an old-age pension for the worker himself. The benefits are no
longer merely planned by others for him, but he is himself saving.
The move is in the right direction. Its character is emphasized
in the following quotation in the Critical Analysis from the
seventh annual report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advance
ment of Teaching:
“In all contributory systems, experience has shown that eventually
the contributors will demand four things: first, that if a contributor is
dismissed or resigns voluntarily before the pensionable age, he shall be
paid the amount of his total contributions, with interest; second, that if a
contributor becomes disabled before the pensionable age, he shall receive
* Pensions: A Problem in Management, by Edward S. Cowdrick, American Management
Association, 1928.
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either a full or proportionate pension; third, that if he dies before retire
ment, his estate shall receive the amount of his total contribution, with
interest, or even the amount of both his and his employer’s contributions,
with interest; fourth, that if he retires upon a pension, but dies
before the total amount of his pension receipts equals the amount of his
total contribution, with interest, his estate shall receive the balance.”

An officer of one of the large consolidations in manufacturing
industry having a non-contributory discretionary plan, has, how
ever, advanced the pertinent question whether it is not better
to have savings plans “that will stand on their own feet, rather
than to operate them under the guise of a pension plan.” I shall
discuss this question later on.
There are, then, these types of pension plans in manufacturing
industry: discretionary and limited-contractual, and each of these
either contributory or non-contributory, and a very few contrac
tual plans. Of the 247 plans in all industries listed in Industrial
Pensions in the United States in 1925, 171 were non-contributory
and wholly discretionary with the employer; 43 were non-con
tributory and limited-contractual; 20 were contributory and
limited-contractual; and the remaining 13 either contractual or
of some special type, but few of these 13 were in manufacturing
industry.
It is presumable that in every industrial concern that has had
a fairly long existence, sufficient for employees to have spent a
large part of their working lives in its service and to have grown
old therein, there has come a time when the management has,
without any pension plan, granted some individual pensions. As
concerns grow larger, and as with the lapse of time present and
prospective pensioners increase in number, a formal plan ap
parently comes to be regarded as desirable. Probably the cost,
present or prospective, comes to be seriously considered, and it is
felt to be necessary to justify the expenditure on business grounds.
A plan is formulated that aims to secure definite benefits to the
employer in return for the pension expense. This seems to be
the usual origin of industrial pension systems.
It was expected that the establishment of formal pension plans
would create feelings of appreciation and increased attachment
on the part of employees; that the prospect of a retirement pen
sion would lift some anxiety from their minds; that as a result
they would give more efficient service, and particularly long con
tinuous service, reducing labor turnover. It is plain that these
expectations have not been very generally fulfilled. In the later
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years more emphasis is placed upon the advantage of an estab
lished routine for retiring aging employees when it is desirable in
the interests of the business to do so.
Except for earlier disability, and possible special circumstances,
pensions in practically all cases are dependent upon two condi
tions, age and length of service. Industrial Pensions in the United
States (pages 72 and 78) contains tables of retirement ages fixed
and length of service required in 118 plans. Compulsory retire
ment ages are from 60 to 70 for men, and from 55 to 70 for women.
Length of service required (with negligible exceptions) ranges
over 20, 25 and 30 years. Continuity of service is insisted upon
in practically all plans. Subject to the right of employees under
contributory plans (of which in 1925 there appear to have been
not more than ten at the outside in manufacturing industry),
all service credits are canceled by resignation, discharge, or going
out on strike. The right of the employer to discharge is kept
intact.
Industrial Pensions in the United States says, “Nearly one half
of all the plans studied fix an age limit for persons entering the
employ of the concern for the first time . . . the age limit ob
served with by far the greatest frequency is 45 years.”
The most serious questions relative to existing pension systems
are concerned with their more obscure workings, and to some
discussion of these I must come later. The plain conditions
as affecting the employees are, in the meantime, serious enough.
Louis D. Brandeis (quoted in Critical Analysis, p. 45) speaks of
them as tending “to rob the working man of his little remaining
industrial liberty.” This seems scarcely an exaggeration, al
though no measure of his liberty is ostensibly taken away from
him. He is placed in a position where perfect freedom of action
can not be exercised without sacrifice. Pension systems are
frankly arranged to create a penalty, which in many cases in any
working force of ordinarily varying ages, must be very heavy,
for going out on strike. The continuous service is broken and
for many it is too late to begin again. But the hampering of the
employee’s freedom of action goes beyond this. He may wish
to change his employment for many reasons; he may have the
opportunity of securing higher wages or other better conditions
elsewhere; and then he has to choose between sacrificing increased
advantage in his working life and sacrificing his prospect of a
retirement pension. And if he sacrifices other advantages for
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The Journal of Accountancy

the prospect of a retirement pension, the latter is still uncertain.
It is, in nearly all cases and at least throughout the working life,
discretionary with the employer. The employee may through
unforeseen causes be obliged to change his employment; he may
be discharged; the employer may fail, or the company be merged
with another company not willing to assume pension liabilities,
as occurred when Morris & Company were merged with Armour
& Company in 1922.
As regards the maximum hiring age, which apparently is an
inevitable accompaniment of the pension based on fixed retire
ment age and length of service, and virtually of all private pension
systems, it seems difficult to imagine anything more deplorable.
Concerning it, a recent writer
*
has said, “There is this seeming
paradox: the very pension systems that are designed to support
old age operate against the employment of men of advanced
years, since employers who pay pensions naturally expect their
workmen to render service for at least reasonably long periods
before reaching retirement age.” The principle is just the same
as if pension systems and maximum hiring ages were universal,
and the man over 45 were left with the simple choice between
his present job and none at all.
If there is a good deal to be said against existing pension plans
from the employees’ side, it seems that the employers have reason
to be seriously concerned about them. Their situation is indeed
drawn in very dark colors. The first of the three articles, already
alluded to, by Gurden Edwards in The Annalist, since republished
by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, is entitled “ Indus
trial pension plans collapsing.” Perhaps this is an extreme view,
but it is difficult to see that it is very different from the conclu
sions arrived at by all who have considered the matter carefully.
The Critical Analysis (p. 2) says, “Very few of the industrial
pension plans in the United States today are so financed that they
are likely to remain solvent without refinancing or modification.”
Industrial Pensions in the United States (p. 101) says, “The
great majority of pension plans in American industry have been
established with no accurate calculation of their future costs and
with no adequate provision for financing them.”
The Carnegie Foundation annual report, 1926, quotes two
authorities. First, Matthew Woll, vice-president of the American
* Edward S. Cowdrick, Pensions: A Problem of Management, American Management Associa
tion, 1928.
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Federation of Labor and president of the Union Labor Life In
surance Company: “Five hundred industrial institutions, among
them many of the strongest in the country, are piling up obliga
tions which will, within a few years, require very large expendi
tures for which no provision is now being made.” And, second,
the 1925 report of the Superintendent of Insurance, state of New
York: “A large percentage of the existing pension systems were
established on unsound bases. Bitter disappointment is in store
for prospective beneficiaries under such unsound systems.”
The simple fact appears to be that industrial concerns have
gone into the business of deferred annuities under conditions
involving risks which no insurance company would assume, and
have done so in the great majority of cases without actuarial
calculations of costs and without funding in due time the re
sources which with accumulations to the maturity of the obliga
tions would suffice to meet them.
It seems very doubtful that even approximately accurate cal
culations are possible under the conditions of the great majority
of existing plans. The pensions eventually payable depend upon
labor turnover. Pensions are payable only to employees remain
ing with the concern until retirement age. The matter can not
be foreseen. It is one aim of the pension plan to produce a differ
ent result from that in past experience. It aims to secure long
continuous service. Next, the great majority of plans provide
for a pension determined by multiplying a percentage of the
average salary of the final 5 or 10 years by the years of service.
The percentage is commonly 1, 11/2 or 2. It is said that the wage
level has risen in this country, from 1913 to 1928, 120 per cent.
Pensions to be paid will therefore be something like double what
might have been calculated for a plan established as long ago as
1913. Gradual adjustment would have been possible, but fre
quent revaluations of the accruing pension liability would have
been necessary, and there is every indication that such frequent
revaluations have been made in very few instances, if any.
Neither change in labor turnover, if indeed there has been any
material change in this, nor change in wage level, which in the
long run would come into relative adjustment, has, however,
been the cause of the unsound condition, said to exist pretty
generally, in industrial pension systems. The real troubles are
lack of actuarial calculations and of funding; or in plainer words,
ignorance of the long-continued increase and the ultimate annual
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burden of pension payments, and neglect of the principle that the
cost of pensions, as a part of the cost of labor, needs to be accrued,
year by year, throughout the years in which the labor is performed.
The way pension payments increase is illustrated in the first
of the Gurden Edwards articles by three charts. The first as
sumes no growth in the payroll in the 30 years preceding the
adoption of the pension plan. In the first year pensions com
mence for employees who entered the service 30 years before.
Each year following the same number becomes eligible. Mortality,
of course, gradually checks the accumulating numbers. The
maximum is reached in 20 years and is then 12 times what it was
in the first year of pension payments.
The second chart assumes an annual increase in employees of
10 per cent. for 20 years, and then no further increase in the
succeeding 10 years of the 30 years preceding the adoption
of the pension plan. The maximum is reached in 34 years and
is then 37 times what it was in the first year of pension payments.
The third chart is said to represent conditions in an actual and
well known manufacturing company. It is said that in this com
pany pension payments, a few years after the installation of the
plan, were becoming heavier than had been expected or provided
for, and that an analysis of the situation revealed an inevitable
burden which the company’s finances could not support, and that
abandonment of the pension plan was recognized to be imperative.
It seems plain that nothing but actuarial calculations can give
any idea of the ultimate liabilities.
It is variously calculated, however, that from 1 per cent. (Gur
den Edwards’ second article) to 2 or 21/2 per cent. (Critical Analy
sis, p. 150) upon current payrolls throughout the employees’
service period, invested currently in interest-bearing securities,
would yield reasonable pensions. These figures contemplate no
withdrawal or death benefits; in other words, they take the full
advantage of labor turnover and mortality. The actual pension
ers are, of course, relatively few.
The relation between the amount necessary, if funded year by
year throughout the working life, and the amount of the ultimate
pension (considering individual cases singly) is shown in the
Gurden Edwards articles by the following examples :
1. Salary $1,000. Employed at 25. Pensioned at 65.
1% X 40 years = $400. Expectancy of life 11 years = $4,400.
Reserve of $38.45 per annum throughout 40 years with 4% interest
accumulations would provide for above.
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2. Salary $1,000. Employed at 30. Pensioned at 65.
$500 pension for 15 years.
Reserve of $75 per annum throughout 35 years with 4% interest
accumulations would provide for above as follows:
Annual contributions..................................
$2,625.00
Interest—contrib. period...........................
3,168.00
“
annuity period...........................
1,753.00
$7,546.00

But in addition to the actual financial difference, there is the
accounting difference. If the necessary percentage of each year’s
payroll is funded immediately, it is an immediate charge complet
ing the cost of the year’s labor in the year’s accounts. If no
sufficient reserve is made currently, it is always left for future
years to complete the payments in remuneration of this year’s
and every year’s labor. The question has been raised, quite
fairly it seems to me, whether the balance-sheet of a concern
having a pension system in operation is correctly stated unless
the accrued pension liability is stated with whatever accuracy is
attainable. It has been estimated (though not in a manufactur
ing industry and therefore probably not with the benefit of the
same labor turnover) that accrued pension liability may equal
a year’s payroll (Critical Analysis, p. 174).
Whatever the amount of the accrued pension liability at a given
date, and assuming that the pensions are ultimately to be paid
according to the plan, by that amount past production costs have
been understated, and the future (except as some provision may
have been made either by separate fund or reserve in the ac
counts) left to bear an expense for which it will be receiving no
return.
Industrial Pensions in the United States (p. 111) has a table,
"Actuarial control and funding,” which contains the following:
Plans reported
“
“
“
“
“
“

as actuarial..............................................
“ non-actuarial......................................
“ funded..................................................
“ not funded...........................................

36
177
85
136

"Reported as actuarial” might mean anything from some ac
tuarial calculations to continuous actuarial control; and "re
ported as funded” would doubtless include all having any pension
fund whatsoever.
[A second article on industrial pensions and wages, by Mr.
Whitmore, will appear in a subsequent issue of The Journal
of Accountancy.—Editor.]
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